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I. INTRODUCTION 
Islamic finance is generally considered as a new discipline, which by 
implication, makes its impact on economic development also a new 
phenomenon not yet fully understood. This way of thinking leaves us with a 
huge unanswered question: if Islamic finance is, indeed, a relatively new 
discipline, how have Muslims managed their financial affairs from the time 
of the Prophet until the present? Alternatively, do those who argue that 
Islamic finance is a new discipline seriously imply that Muslims of the earlier 
centuries did not have any idea about finance?  
Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, Islamic finance is as old as 
Islam itself and constituted an inseparable part of an entire economic system. 
This was basically an ethical, commercial, pre-industrial capitalist system, 
which antedated western capitalism by a millennium. Between the tenth and 
the fourteenth centuries, the west borrowed many of the principles and 
institutions of Islamic capitalism.
1
 Medieval Europe even practiced a 
stringent  prohibition of the rate of interest. But then between the sixteenth 
and the eighteenth centuries, first with the “Reformation” and then the 
“Enlightenment”, the prohibition was relaxed, and equally important, the 
ethical constraints were compromised. In the process, the original ethical 
capitalist was replaced by the rational homo-economicus who was an 
invention of the positivist mind. Devoid of all ethical and religious concerns 
enshrined in holy texts, a new set of laws governing the behaviour of the 
homo-economicus had to be invented. As Abbas Mirakhor has argued, ever 
since Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, the western economic theory has 
been bussy trying to do just this.
2
  
By contrast, Muslims not being burdened by a highly centralized church and 
its ruthless Inquisition, never felt the need to discard the basic teachings of 
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their religion.
3
 Consequently, their economic reasoning have always been 
shaped by the classical sources of Islam. We are now at a position to discuss 
the basic characteristics of Islamic economics and finance, the outcome of 
this reasoning. 
II. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY AND 
FINANCE 
Islamic finance and economic development obey certain rules and principles, 
which originate in the basic teachings of Islam. The best known of these 
principles is, of course, the prohibition of interest. The immediate 
consequence of the prohibition is the problem of combining the factors of 
production. Put differently, if; 
 
Q=f(K, L, N, E,….) 
is a simple production function, where  
Q is production, 
K is capital, 
L is labour, 
N is natural resources and 
E is entrepreneurship, 
then combining these factors becomes a conditio sine qua non for production. 
Indeed, unless a way is found to combine these factors, each owned by different 
persons, no production can take place.  
In conventional economies, the capitalist is compensated for the use of his 
capital with interest and the entrepreneur with profit. In an Islamic economy, 
however, since interest is prohibited, the system of rewards becomes more 
complicated: the capitalist cannot be rewarded with the rate of interest anymore 
and the capitalist’s capital cannot be transferred to the entrepreneur through 
conventional ways. The problem is solved by rewarding the capitalist also with 
profit. Put differently, the capitalist and the entrepreneur begin sharing the 
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profits. But there is a further complication, since profits are generated by taking 
risks, this means that risks are also shared. Since some risks inevitably lead to 
losses, this means that losses too must be shared.  
Thus, when the capitalist is rewarded not by interest but by profits, the capitalist 
and the entrepreneur end up sharing not only the profits, but also risks and losses 
as well. As a result, the economy changes its character and what we may call, a 
“share economy” emerges. We can therefore say with confidence that sharing of 
risks, profits and losses is the most essential trait of an Islamic economy.  
Another very important principle of Islamic economy concerns profits. Unlike 
the conventional economy where profit maximization, pure and simple, 
prevails, in an Islamic economy constrained maximization is the rule. A 
Muslim businessman tries to maximize his profits subject to ethical 
considerations imposed by his religion. Thus, providing profits are generated 
through helal, legitimate means, there is no upper limit imposed on them. It 
has been argued that Islam first equips a Muslim with ethical principles and 
then leaves him free to compete.
4
  
There are only a few taxes mentioned in the Qur’an leading some Islamic 
economists wonder how additional taxes can be imposed. But this is missing 
the point. The message of the Qur’an should be obvious: in an Islamic 
economy taxes should be few and the tax burden should be light. With 
government revenue thus limited, assuming balanced budget, expenditures too 
must be limited. Since national defence constitutes the most important and 
inelastic government expenditure, which cannot be compromised, this means 
that bulk of the tax revenue must be earmarked for defence leaving other 
important social services such as health and education inadequately funded. 
Ottoman budgets from the sixteenth century demonstrate that this was indeed 
the case.
5
  
The resulting gap in the provision of services was filled by the waqf system. 
Known as charitable or philanthropic foundations in the west, waqfs were 
voluntary endowments provided by high net-worth individuals in order to 
finance, organize and maintain in perpetuity the most important services 
needed by the society. That this was not just in theory but found widespread 
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application in the Islamic world is attested by the magnificent architectural 
monuments all over the Islamic world from the shores of the Atlantic to the 
ends of the Indian Ocean. But architecture represents just the tip of the 
iceberg. The predominant role waqfs played in Muslims’ lives has been 
explained by Yediyildiz, who argued that  
“a person could be born in a house belonging to a waqf, sleep in a cradle 
provided by that waqf, be educated in the school of the waqf and read the 
books provided by it, become a teacher in the waqf’s school, earn a waqf 
financed salary and at his death be placed in a waqf provided coffin for burial 
in a waqf cemetery.”6 
III. IMPLEMENTATION 
The reader may wonder at this point whether and how the theoretical model of 
an Islamic economy presented above very briefly has ever been actually 
implemented. If we first view the question: “whether”, this is not a new 
question at all. Western historians of Islamic economic/social history have 
long debated whether the principles mentioned above were purely theoretical 
and were confined to law books. It was another western historian Abraham 
Udovitch who brought the debate to a conclusion. Referring particularly to the 
interest prohibition, Udovitch was able to demonstrate that by and large the 
prohibition was observed in real life.
7
  
This brings us to the question, “how?”. How, indeed, was the prohibition 
observed and, by implication, how were the different factors of production 
combined? The simple answer is; through the institutions. It was indeed 
through various institutions that the classical principles of an Islamic economy 
were applied in real life. To give just a few examples; sharing profits, risks 
and losses between the capitalist and the entrepreneur was made possible by 
the institution of business partnerships. Indeed, it was through these 
partnerships that the capital owned by the capitalist could be transferred to the 
entrepreneur. Thus sharing risks, profits and losses replaced the rate of 
interest. Moreover, despite modest government revenue, waqfs made 
provision of important services to the society possible. There were serious 
efforts to maximize government revenue throughout centuries by continuous 
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reforms of public finance institutions, but these primarily aimed at financing 
the ever rising military expenditure, leaving the primarily waqf financed 
services more or less untouched.
8
 
All of this brings us to the next vital question, which constitutes the essence of 
the present volume: Islamic Finance and Economic Development. Namely, 
have the classical principles of Islamic finance and economy, together with 
the institutions which applied these principles, ever led to economic 
development? Do we have any historical evidence of sustained and significant 
economic development in the Islamic world? We will now turn our attention 
to these questions. 
 
IV. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE  
For obvious reasons, we cannot resort to the types of data, such as the GNP or 
income per capita, used by modern economists. Instead we have to rely on 
indirect evidence. Notwithstanding this, there is powerful historical evidence 
that from the early eighth century onwards, Muslims acquired a core position 
from where they were able to link the two most important economic zones of 
the world; the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Andre Wink has argued 
that establishing an Islamic superstructure on “the rich urbanite substratum of 
late antiquity and by fusing the formerly rival Byzantine and Sasanid 
commercial circuits and forcing links between the two zones, the Islamic 
Caliphate from the eighth to the eleventh century achieved an unquestioned 
economic supremacy in the world”.9 Muslim impact and economic might did 
not remain limited to the two seas, vast swathes of not only Northern India but 
even Europe were incorporated into the Islamic world-economy. Historians 
now even speak of the “economic Islamization of early medieval Europe”.10  
Substantial evidence has been found in Arab navigation manuals that 
circumnavigation of Africa, from East to West, was first achieved by 
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Muslims. Thus the European “discovery” of the Cape of Good Hope was 
simply the discovery of the already discovered!
11
 
Post-Roman Europe, utterly destroyed by the Völkerwanderung, was 
drastically de-monetized and desperately needed Islamic coinage.
12
 Trade was 
the only way coins could be obtained. Not being able to produce the goods 
which Muslims needed, Europeans began to sell furs and even themselves! It 
was not accidental that the Vikings became important in this period – they 
were the master slave traders and flourished by kidnapping, enslaving and 
then selling their fellow Europeans to the Muslims. Muslims paid for these 
with their coins. Fifty-four finds of Islamic coins have been discovered all 
over the Carolingian empire as well as even in distant Scandinavia – the land 
of the Vikings. McCormick provides us with solid and immutable evidence 
about the monetary might of the Muslims.
13
 It is thanks to these coins that 
post-Roman Europe was able to re-monetize its economy.  
These successes were achieved by applying the principles of Islamic 
capitalism enshrined in the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions, Sunna, with 
the help of specially designed, Shari’ah based institutions. Consider, for 
instance, money itself, the most fundamental building block of any economy. 
How come, indeed, Muslim coins were found all over medieval Europe and 
from where came this monetary power? For this we need to look into the way 
Muslims monetized their commerce. Put differently, we need to understand 
how Muslims were catapulted from the age of barter to the age of money.  
Indeed, in the absence of money, barter is the only other known method of 
commerce. Yet, barter necessitates a double coincidence of wants. That is to say, 
what merchant A wants to exchange, should be needed by merchant B and what 
B wants to exchange should be needed by A. Moreover, it is also necessary that 
both of these individuals should personally come together in a market. By 
contrast, in monetized trade A can sell his merchandise to third persons and with 
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the money he receives he can travel to another market and there purchase B’s 
goods in exactly the amount he wishes. Furthermore, since it is possible to send 
money over long distances, he does not even have to travel himself and can have 
the transaction completed by correspondence. The commercial advantage of 
trading with money over barter is thus obvious. Finally, since it is nearly 
impossible to measure the exact value of the goods exchanged in barter, any 
such transaction may involve an element of unjustified enrichment. It is 
probably based upon such concerns that Prophet Muhammad discouraged barter 
while encouraging monetized trade.  
 This policy is revealed in two ahadith, Prophetic statements, one clear and 
the other subtle. First the former, narrated in Malik’s Muwatta: 
“Someone brought some excellent dates to the Messenger of God as a gift. The 
Prophet asked ‘are all dates of Khaybar like this?’ The man said, ‘No, 
Messenger of God! We take a sa’ of this kind for two sa’s or two sa’s for three’. 
Upon this, the Messenger of God said: ‘Do not do that. Sell the assorted ones for 
dirhams and then buy the good ones with the dirhams”. 
 In this hadith, the Prophet clearly disapproves of barter and orders 
Muslims to resort to trade instead.
14
 In the next hadith, narrated by al-Bukhari 
and Muslim on the authority of Ubadah ibn al Samit, the Prophet takes a 
dramatic step further and declares barter a form of riba, i.e., interest, and 
condemns it.
15
 
“Gold for gold, equivalent for equivalent; silver for silver, equivalent for 
equivalent; dates for dates, equivalent for equivalent; salt for salt, equivalent for 
equivalent; barley for barley, equivalent for equivalent and whoever exceeds or 
asks for excess, he practiced al-riba. Sell gold for silver as you wish if it is hand 
to hand (prompt delivery), and sell barley for dates as you wish if it is hand to 
hand.”16 
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 The wisdom behind this hadith is not easy to understand. Actually, even 
today, more than 1400 years after it had been actually stated, some important 
scholars admit they do not really understand it.
17
  The reason they do not 
understand it is because they consider the hadith from a legal perspective and 
ignore the historical circumstances in which it had been stated. With this hadith, 
the Prophet clearly makes barter almost impossible and encourages monetized 
trade. This is because, if the merchants wish to barter like objects, say, dates for 
dates, they are ordered to do so exactly equivalent for equivalent with total 
disregard to quality differences, actually a near impossibility. Indeed, they are 
told that when doing this particular case of bartering if one of them does not 
obey the rule “equivalent for equivalent” and asks for his higher quality dates a 
higher amount of the lower quality dates from the other party, he would be 
committing riba. In short, merchants who wish to barter like-objects are not 
allowed to take quality differences into consideration and are restricted severely 
to barter only exactly “equivalent for equivalent”. While with this particular 
hadith, the Prophet does not prohibit the barter of like objects outright but makes 
it entirely unpractical and almost meaningless, with the previous one, he teaches 
the merchants how to trade like-objects by utilising a medium of exchange, i.e., 
dirhams or coins.  
 Bartering objects of the same genre, say, silver for gold, is less strict: it is 
permitted subject to prompt delivery. It has been argued that the wisdom behind 
this insistence on prompt delivery is the possible change in the relative values of 
the goods in question if deferred payment is allowed. Since this would lead to an 
unjustified enrichment for one of the parties, prompt delivery condition is 
imposed.
18
 While this is certainly possible, I would argue that the real wisdom 
must be sought in the entirety of the hadith. What the Prophet has done here is 
to apply a hierarchy of restrictions with the purpose of gradually but surely 
leading merchants from barter to monetized trade. Indeed, while the barter of 
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 Consider the following interview conducted with Sheikh Esam M. Ishaq, a Board member of the Discover 
Islam Centre in Bahrain and Shari’ah advisor to several Islamic financial institutions. “If I am going to exchange 
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deductive. Outwardly, I can’t give you a single reason or explanation but I know that it is there explicitly in the 
theological text”. Parker, “Shari’ah Advisories”,  pp.160-61. 
18
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like-objects (gold for gold) is most severely restricted, the barter of objects of 
the same genre (silver for gold, or, barley for wheat) is permitted subject to 
prompt delivery and finally the exchange (sale) of precious metals with 
commodities, say, gold for wheat, is not even mentioned in the hadith implying 
that it is entirely unrestricted.  To sum up, by progressively relaxing the 
restrictions, the Prophet has catapulted Islamic community from the age of 
barter to the age of monetized exchange.
19
  
This progress from barter to monetized trade must have been the conditio sine 
qua non for the establishment of an intercontinental trade system from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific, which Muslims soon after the birth of Islam, came to 
dominate. If the gradual elimination of barter and its replacement by monetized 
trade was the conditio sine qua non for the establishment of an intercontinental 
trade network, the conditio sine qua non for the monetization of trade must have 
been the very existence of money. Indeed, the transition from barter to 
monetized trade could not possibly have materialised without a massive increase 
in the supply of money.  
In a bimetallic system, which dominated the world trade in this era, an increase 
in the supply of money was only possible with a corresponding increase in the 
supply of silver and gold. Under normal circumstances, a drastic increase in the 
supply of these precious metals is not possible. But during the seventh-eighth 
centuries circumstances were by no means normal. For, this was the period 
when Islam expanded at the expense of the two great empires of the period: the 
Byzantine and the Sasanid. What dramatically changed the world economic 
history with the conquest of the Byzantine and Sasanid territories was the 
capture of massive amounts of hoarded gold and silver in the Byzantine 
churches and Sasanid temples.
20
  The gold and silver treasures hoarded by these 
institutions were melt down and then minted. Aggregate money supply 
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increased in this way and a new economic system based upon monetised trade 
and dominated by the Muslims could thus become a reality.
21
 
 A closer look at the radical increase in the money supply reveals that this 
has been achieved in two steps. First, the coins of the conquered Byzantine and 
Sasanid territories continued to be the legal tender in the Islamic empire. Since 
Byzantine coins were gold and Sasanid ones silver based, this meant a de facto 
bimetallic system. The tolerance towards these earlier coins meant that the now 
much enlarged economy of the Islamic community experienced minimum 
disruption. Second, when it was decided to mint new Islamic coins, the precious 
metal content of these was kept deliberately lower than the earlier coins. 
Apparently, it was understood that the bad money would drive away the good 
money and in this way Islamic coins came to replace the earlier Byzantine and 
Sasanid coins. That bad money replaces the good money and the latter comes to 
be hoarded and taken out of circulation is, of course, known as the Gresham’s 
Law and Muslims apparently had understood the principle behind it almost a 
millennium before Gresham.
22
  
 To sum up, Muslim coinage not only replaced the earlier imperial coins 
but also spread rapidly and dominated the economies of Europe, the Middle East 
as well as India.
23
 Van Der Wee, an eminent Belgian economic historian, also 
confirms that re-monetization of Europe after the Völkerwanderung and the re-
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birth of the European banking system owe much to the flow of Muslim coinage 
to Europe.
24
 
International trade, however, would not have been possible without a 
sophisticated maritime law. A well-known French historian Daniel Panzac, has 
shown that this institution was also provided by Muslims. This originally 
Islamic law of maritime trade was transferred to Europe through various 
compilations. 
 The three most important compilations were made during the eleventh-
twelfth centuries. These were the Maritime Laws of Rhodes, Oleron and the 
Consolato del Mare. It is now definitively established that the first one, 
previously considered to be a derivative of the Roman-Byzantine digests, was in 
fact based on Al-Mudawwana al-Kubra by Sahnun Ibn Sa’id al Tanukhi (d. 
854). It was commented upon by Ibn Rushd (Averroes d. 1117) and drafted in 
Sicily or South Italy, both Muslim territories during the ninth-eleventh centuries. 
The second was authored by the Court of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem in 
order to harmonise trade relations between the occidental and oriental Christians 
as well as Muslims. This compilation was brought to Europe partly by Eleanor 
of Aquitaine and partly by her son Richard the Lionheart. The contents of the 
Oleron compilation are identical to the Muslim laws of the ninth-tenth centuries. 
Finally, the Consolato del Mare was written in Spain. The document originates 
in the Muslim Middle Eastern texts of the eighth-ninth centuries and was later 
brought to Andalusia. It was translated during the reign of King Alphonse in 
thirteenth century Castille as part of the great works of translation from Arabic.
25
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 One of the most important components of the maritime laws transferred to 
Europe, was the law of partnerships, or more specifically, the Islamic mudaraba. 
This particular partnership, so essential for financing an entrepreneur, was learnt 
by Italian merchants doing business in the Middle East. It then became a custom 
among them and as such was incorporated into the various compilations just 
mentioned, which facilitated the diffusion of  mudaraba to Europe, where it 
came to be known as commenda. It is generally agreed that commenda was the 
most important business partnership of medieval Europe and that it played a 
crucial role in triggering the “commercial revolution”.26  
An equally important institution that was borrowed by the medieval 
Europeans from the Muslims was the waqf. As it is well known, waqf 
establishes, finances and maintains, often for centuries, the most essential 
services any civilized society needs. Foremost among them are the institutions 
of learning and health, in short, institutions which enhance human capital. We 
have now definitive evidence that once borrowed, waqf played an enormously 
important role in the borrowing civilization. To give a highly dramatic example, 
one of the earliest colleges of Oxford (Merton College) was established in the 
form of an Islamic madrasa and its endowment deed was practically identical to 
an Islamic waqf deed.
27
  
 International trade soon necessitated a whole spectrum of new financial 
instruments. Indeed, invention of other business instruments facilitating 
monetary transactions did not have to wait very long. Bills of exchange, letters 
of credit (suftaja), promissory notes, ordinary check, and double entry book 
keeping were all known to the Muslims. Historians are in general agreement that 
medieval Europe simply borrowed these instruments from the Muslims and 
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could not improve upon them!
28
 Without these financial instruments long 
distance trade would simply have been impossible. 
Economic/financial principles enshrined in the classical sources undoubtedly 
point to a capitalist system. This was Islamic, ethical capitalism, which 
preceded that of the West by a millennium.
29
 It is now well established that all 
the legal and institutional pre-requisites for financing and administering 
capitalist production and exchange were in place in the Islamic world long 
before the Europeans started using them.
30
 
It appears that these institutions were highly efficient. The fact that they were 
borrowed by the west shows that they must have operated at lower transaction 
costs.
31
 This is because, the direction of institutional borrowing between two 
civilizations is from the low cost one to the higher cost one. Put differently, 
the civilization with the high cost institutions ends up borrowing the lower 
cost institutions of the other.
32
 All of this has been confirmed by the French 
historian Sayous long ago: 
“The Muslims had, during the 10th-11th centuries incontestably more 
perfect commercial methods than those of the Europeans’…The 
Christians of Europe could not improve upon them”33 
Application of the economic/financial principles enshrined in the Qur’an and the 
Sunna by efficient institutions, accompanied by the conquest of vast areas of the 
formerly Byzantine and Sasanid empires, created massive wealth. The economic 
integration of new territories was achieved by merchants, particularly the so-
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called Karimi merchants, who connected the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean 
via Yemen. Karimis were already observed in Fatimid times and their fabuluous 
wealth is well known.
34
  
Wealth, on the other hand, made massive investments through the waqf 
system in education and research possible. The magnum opus of Fuat Sezgin 
provides a detailed and most impressive account of the scientific advances 
achieved by Muslims in this period.
35
  
Finally, the relentless attacks by Crusaders from the West and Mongols from 
the East, attest strongly to the relative wealth of the Islamic world. After all, 
these attacks basically aimed at plunder and it is the wealthy, who attracts 
plunderers. 
 
V: STAGNATION AND DECLINE 
A cursory look at the Islamic world today would suffice to indicate how far 
this region has declined from its original glory described above. There is an 
ongoing debate on the causes of decline of the Islamic world. Most recently, 
Timur Kuran’s arguments have become very popular. Although he has made 
quite convincing arguments, the initial enthusiasm with which the scholarly 
community welcomed his views is now waning.
36
 This is because, while he 
has boldly accused Islamic jurisprudence with weak evidence, more refined 
arguments have been made
37
, which were supported by solid archival 
research.
38
 Moreover, his theoretical arguments have also been criticized.
39
  
In a nut shell, new research has suggested that rather than the alleged rigidity 
of Islamic jurisprudence, the culprit for the decline of the Islamic world 
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should be sought in a variety of factors. Of these, the increasing centralization 
and militarization of the region which occurred in response to the massive 
pincer attacks by the crusaders and the Mongols, appears to have been the 
most important. The degree to which this militarization occurred and led to 
the rise of a garrison state has been indirectly quantified by Maya Shatzmiller, 
who showed that from the 8
th
-11
th
 centuries to the 12
th
-15
th
, the 
military/bureaucratic occupations in the Islamic world increased by 200 
percent.
40
  
Moreover, since the pincer actions never ceased (Mongols, though 
temporarily defeated in 1258, were still attacking in 1394 and the Crusaders in 
1403), the centralization/militarization must have intensified in the long run. 
Indeed, the decline of the famous Karimi merchants in the fifteenth century is 
attributed to the ever increasing demands for funds of the central Mamluk 
government.
41
 The Mamluk government played an important role in 
transforming the very structure of the spice trade from the traditional 
competitive one to increasing government monopolization. Thus, competitive 
markets and entrepreneurship were steadily choked by the ever increasing 
taxes, price fixing and monopolies transforming classical Islamic capitalism 
into something new.
42
 Monopolization of the spice trade reached to a zenith in 
the period 1429-34 and brought the Karimi era to a decisive end. After 
establishing a government monopoly over the pepper trade in 1429, Sultan 
Barsbay prohibited the Venetian merchants from disembarking in the 
Alexandria harbor. Finally, in 1434 Barsbay forbade all contacts between the 
Venetians and the Karimis and then completely cornered the pepper market, 
later expanding his monopoly to other items.
43
 
Although this transformation of Egypt and Syria into a garrison state allowed 
these states to regain and then preserve their territorial independence, it did so 
at the cost of gradually weakening the classical Islamic capitalism and 
replacing it with the ever increasing state control of the economy.  
                                           
40
 Shatzmiller, Labour, p. 258. Shatzmiller has actually confirmed the earlier observation of Abu-Lughod, p. 147. 
41
 Ashtor, “The Karimi Merchants”, p. 53. 
42
 Abu-Lughod, Before the European Hegemony, pp. 228-229. 
43
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Evidence pertaining to the evolution of the Egyptian sugar industry supports 
this argument. Whereas during the thirteenth and the early fourteenth 
centuries this industry was able to satisfy both the prodigious local demand 
and exported large quantities to Europe and was described as “capitalistic” in 
the sense that big trusts were systematically pushing aside the smaller 
enterprises, the capitalists themselves appear to have been eventually pushed 
aside by the Mamluk officials. Penetration of the Mamluks into this industry 
proved to be disastrous for the Egyptian economy in the long run: not only 
these officials paid lower taxes than the capitalist plantation owners, they 
could also mobilize peasants through the corvée (forced labor). Eventually, 
during the fourteenth and particularly the fifteenth century, they even began to 
force merchants to buy their own and the sultan’s sugar at inflated prices and 
took full advantage of their oligopsony powers to purchase the products of 
civilian producers at depressed prices. Such market distortions and property 
rights violations undoubtedly caused the technological stagnation observed in 
the Egyptian sugar industry during the fifteenth century precisely when the 
European sugar refining techniques began to improve substantially.
44
 
These developments were by no means specific to Mamluk Egypt. They were 
observed in varying degrees in other Islamic empires as well and culminated 
in the emergence of the so-called Ottoman proto-quasi socialism.
45
 Thus, it 
can be argued that the constant warfare and the instinct for survival 
transformed the once capitalistic Islamic economies into proto-quasi 
socialism.
46
 This argument has been supported by research conducted in the 
Ottoman archives, which has revealed wide-spread, consistent and long 
lasting price and profit controls, property rights limitations, even confiscations 
– all socialist traits.47 Latest on-going research by Mehmet Genç in the 
                                           
44
 Abu-Lughod, ibid., pp. 232-233, 236. 
45
 “Proto” because, the socialism practiced first by the medieval Islamic states and then the Ottoman empire 
antedated Marxist socialism by centuries; “quasi” because, it was not based upon the Marxist principles and 
class conflict but, on the contrary, aimed at creating harmony between all citizens, thus following the Qur’anic 
notion of “ummatan wasatan”, a society of the middle, but doing so, went to the other extreme and choked 
the private enterprise.  
46
 For a full treatment of the concept of “proto-quasi socialism”, see; Çizakça, “The Ottoman Government”, 
forthcoming. 
47
 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, passim. Pamuk is more cautious and argues that Ottoman interventionism was 
selective rather than comprehensive. See his, “Ottoman Interventionism”.  
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Ottoman archives has also revealed powerful government monopolies and a 
detailed explanation of their modus operandi, lending further support to this 
argument.
48
 
VI. RELEVANCE FOR TODAY, WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE? 
If the above conclusion about the proto-quasi socialism and its long lasting 
impact on the Islamic world is correct, then it should be possible to come up 
with a policy recommendation. Muslims inhibited for centuries by “proto-quasi 
socialism”, should re-discover their own ethical capitalism with all its principles 
and institutions enshrined in the classical sources of Islam. The new Islamic 
economics should focus primarily on the re-discovery of the classical economic 
principles and their implementation through institutions. Put differently, rather 
than mimicking the west where very special circumstances had prevailed and the 
need was felt to discover new laws of economics, Islamic economists should 
focus instead on the re-discovery of the major financial/economic principles and 
institutions of their own past and their adaptation to current needs.
49
 
Actually, this process has already started! The first building block, Tabung Haji, 
was laid down by Ungku Aziz, a member of the royal family of Johor and then 
an economist at the University of Malaya. He submitted a memorandum to the 
Malaysian Parliament in 1959, which aimed at financing and organizing the 
modern pilgrimage. Ungku Aziz was able to transform the process of 
preparation for the pilgrimage into a powerful financial institution. Initially, the 
total number of depositors was recorded at 1,281, which increased to more than 
five million in 2009. The original depositors had paid in RM 46,610 which 
increased to RM 897,068,886 in 2008.
50
 In recognition of the enormous services 
he has rendered to Malaysia, the Royal Professor Ungku Aziz was offered the 
highest honorific title “Tun” by three different Prime Ministers as well as the 
prestigious Royal Award for Islamic Finance but declined to accept all as a 
matter of principle. There is no doubt that the Tabung Haji will be emulated by 
the rest of the Islamic world.  
Still another success story occurred in the field of banking. This pertains to the 
classical mudaraba partnership and its successful modernization. As it is well-
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known, the mudaraba partnership is a true profit and loss sharing partnership 
originally practiced by the Prophet. The problem with this partnership, however, 
was that it was practiced in history usually by a rab al-mal and a mudarib,i.e., 
only two partners. This meant that the capital entrusted to the agent remained 
quite limited. A mechanism by which the savings of thousands of people could 
be entrusted to a powerful agent did not exist in the early history of Islam.  
The crucial step for this purpose was taken by Dr. Ahmad al-Naggar in the year 
1963. This was the establishment of the first ever Islamic bank in Mit Ghamr in 
Egypt. This bank was envisaged as a multiple mudaraba with hundreds of 
depositors/investors entrusting their hard earned savings to it acting as the 
mudarib, agent. Today, Islamic banks are flourishing all over the Islamic world, 
even in non-Muslim countries, collecting the savings of hundreds of thousands 
Muslims and non-Muslims and channelling them for profitable projects. We can 
argue with confidence that Islamic banks have transformed Muslim countries 
from being non-bank societies to banking societies. This modernization of a 
classical Islamic partnership is not an achievement to be underestimated. 
But at this context it is important to remember that one of the most important 
goals of Dr. Al-Naggar, enhancement of entrepreneurship through these banks, 
has not materialized. Had Dr. al-Naggar’s original plan of applying the 
mudaraba not only at the liability side but also at the asset side been followed, 
the goal would have been fulfilled and Islamic banks would have been able to 
create thousands of entrepreneurs.
51
 But as it is well-known, the asset side of 
Islamic banks is dominated by murabaha sales, not the most useful instrument 
to enhance entrepreneurship. Islamic banks preferred to utilize the murabaha 
primarily because they were worried about their committments to pay back their 
depositors. Because Mudaraba is a long term and risky instrument, there were 
serious concerns about the mismatch of funds. Murabaha, by contrast, provided 
fixed returns that could be paid back to the depositors easily. 
All of this indicates that, as far as encouraging entrepreneurship is concerned, 
the task is not yet completed. Scholars are now actively searching for other 
historical instruments that can be modernized so as to  provide both fix returns 
to the depositors and at the same time also enhance entrepreneurship through 
                                           
51
 Mudaraba protects the entrepreneur by shifting all the pecuniary loss to the capitalist. It is therefore truly a 
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equity finance. In short, there is an urgent need for the development of hybrid 
instruments.  
One of these is esham, originally utilized by the Ottoman Caliphate back in 1775 
to borrow large Shari’ah based funds from the public in order to pay a huge war 
indemnity to the Russians.
52
 A research team at INCEIF, the Global University 
of Islamic Finance at Kuala Lumpur, has identified esham as a multiple, 
unlimited mandate mudaraba, which also yielded fixed returns.
53
 Thus, the 
battle to develop Shari’ah based profit and loss sharing funds not only 
enhancing entrepreneurship but also yielding fixed returns to the investors has 
now reached a new plateau. The INCEIF team is convinced that esham can be 
used for government borrowing. Some team members are also of the opinion 
that it can be used by the central banks of Islamic countries for open market 
operations as well as for small and medium enterprise financing.  
A close look at sukuk, on the other hand, has revealed that this instrument also 
represents the modernization of not one but two historical instruments, cash 
waqfs and, once again, esham. To what extent the financial engineers who 
designed the sukuk, were aware of these historical instruments is not yet clear – 
at least one engineer has claimed that he was. Be that as it may, the sale-lease 
back-repurchase method so often used in most sukuk al-ijara was originally 
utilized in the Ottoman cash waqfs. The special purpose vehicle, the crucial part 
of any sukuk,  itself, is but a simple cash waqf. As for securitization, that is the 
idea of dividing a revenue stream into equal parts to be sold to the public, this 
was first used in 1775 as explained above. In short, sukuk, which is currently the 
most popular instrument of borrowing, whether sovereign or private, is also a 
highly successful example of financial engineering using historical instruments.  
Still another successful modernization occurred in the field of insurance leading 
to Takaful. This involved the modernization of the age old al-aqilah, a tribal 
custom among the Arabs going back even to the pre-Islamic era.
54
 
In short, the revival of historical financial instruments to enhance contemporary 
Islamic finance is well on its way. This is taking place either by an economist 
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redesigning an ancient tradition (Tabung Haji and the Mit Ghamr Bank), or 
financial engineers, not aware of historical instruments, re-discovering them 
without realizing their origins (sukuk), or more deliberately and systematically, 
by economic/financial historians informing financial engineers and Shari’ah 
scholars about certain historical instruments and reviving them together in a 
joint effort (esham). The latter is the method used by INCEIF.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Islamic economics is unique in the sense that while one sub-branch of it, 
finance, has developed by leaps and bounds, the discipline itself has by and 
large stagnated. This lop-sided development of the field, has led us to expect 
Islamic finance almost singlehandedly to lead to economic development. But no 
financial system, no matter how perfect, can generate economic growth without 
the rest of the economy following and the rest of the economy cannot follow the 
financial sector unless certain pre-conditions are satisfied.  
These pre-conditions are, in a nut-shell,  the rule of law, the democratic package, 
the basic freedoms and the avoidance of sectarian violence. A detailed analysis 
of these concepts and their compatibility with the Shari`ah, however, would be 
well beyond the confines of this article.
55
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